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Abstract
This article presents a literature review on the welfare
effects of excessive company taxation practices. The article
intends to structure the debate by sketching a conceptual
framework of thought for the topic under consideration and
places the existing literature within this framework. The arti-
cle ends with a thought-provoking discussion between two
extreme papers in the literature, one against tax planning
and one in favour. The discussion is concluded by identify-
ing the fundamental differences in assumptions underlying
both approaches.
Keywords: tax planning, optimal taxation, tax competition,
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1 Introduction
Excessive company taxation practices are again being
intensely discussed in the public debate. Recently, there
have been hearings of the CEOs of a number of Multi-
national Enterprises (MNEs) in the United Kingdom
(e.g., Starbucks, Google and Amazon) and the United
States (Apple).1 In the Netherlands, the political parties
in the opposition are fulminating against the practice of
MNEs using fiscal detours through the Netherlands to
reduce their effective tax bill. Furthermore, the Europe-
an Commission (EC) and the OECD have taken up their
attempts to fight such harmful tax practices.2 This pub-
lic attention is not new; it tends to pop up every few
years. After some time, journalists will start to complain
about the low effective tax bill of MNEs, and in their
aftermath, politicians and some opinion leaders are
upset, which in turn upsets the voters (or in some other
order). Unfortunately, an overall view, including a con-
sistent conceptual framework, is missing in almost all
these discussions, leading to unfortunate conclusions.
This article is devoted to the question of whether, from
the perspective of an economist, supranational coopera-
tion is needed to stop ‘excessive company taxation prac-
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1. See on the website of the BBC the article titled ‘Starbucks, Google and
Amazon Grilled over Tax Avoidance’, and the article ‘Koffieketen Star-
bucks Zwicht’, Het Financieel Dagblad, 7 December 2012.
2. See for example the Report of the European Council of 23 May 2013.
tices’ within the European Union (EU). In this context,
the phrase ‘excessive company taxation practices’ is re-
lated to both the tax-planning activities of firms and
preferential tax setting by tax authorities. I aim to ach-
ieve two goals with this article. First, the article discuss-
es the main conclusions in the economic literature on
the topic. Given the numerous papers that are written
on this matter, this review is not complete, and the dis-
cussion is therefore intended to give an overview of the
topics covered.3 Second, and most importantly, a con-
ceptual framework of thought is developed that helps to
structure the debate on excessive company taxation
practices. The conceptual framework is used to clarify
some of the inconsistencies in the public debate and to
place the scientific articles discussed within a broader
context.
This article does not assess whether it is possible at all to
remove excessive company taxation practices, and
whether government action in this direction has been
successful.4 Instead, I begin one step earlier, raising the
question of whether such measures should be undertak-
en at all. This being the objective, the article will not
discuss the empirical evidence on excessive company
taxation. Although equally important, welfare losses are
computed with the use of empirical estimates of the sta-
tistics that are suggested by a proper welfare analysis,
this article will focus on the latter topic. In general,
empirical evidence confirms the responsiveness of capi-
tal flows to taxation.5 In addition, an interesting recent
3. Excellent review papers on the tax competition literature are J.D. Wil-
son, ‘Theories of Tax Competition’, 52 National Tax Journal, at
269-304 (1999); G.R. Zodrow, ‘Tax Competition and Tax Coordination
in the European Union’, 10 International Tax and Public Finance, at
651-671 (2003); J.D. Wilson and D.E. Wildasin, ‘Capital Tax Competi-
tion: Bane or Boon?’, 88 Journal of Public Economics, at 1065-1091
(2004); G. Nicodeme, ‘Corporate Tax Competition and Coordination in
the European Union: What Do We Know? Where Do We Stand?’,
MPRA Working Paper No. 107 (2006); and recently M. Keen and K.A.
Konrad, ‘International Tax Competition and Coordination’, Max Planck
Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper No. 2012-06
(2012).
4. See for example M. Ruf and A.J. Weichenrieder, ‘The Taxation of Pas-
sive Foreign Investment: Lessons from German Experience’, 45 Canadi-
an Journal of Economics, at 1504-1528 (2012), who show that it might
indeed be possible to tax passive income abroad.
5. Some excellent review articles that cover the most important papers in
the empirical literature are: D. Dharmapala, ‘What Do We Know about
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the Empirical Literature’,
CESifo Working Paper No. 4612 (2014); R.A. De Mooij, ‘The Tax Elas-
ticities of Corporate Debt: A Synthesis of Size and Variations’, IMF
Working Paper WP/11/95 (2011); and R.A. De Mooij and S. Ederveen,
‘Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: A Synthesis of Empirical
Research’, 10 International Tax and Public Finance, at 673-693 (2003).
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insight is that the magnitude of base erosion and profit
shifting (BEPS) is typically smaller in recent studies
compared with older research.6
The article provides some counter-intuitive insights to
the uninformed reader as I will claim below that obtain-
ing revenue from multinationals is not a valid policy
objective and that tax planning might, in some circum-
stances, actually be welfare improving. This stands in
sharp contrast to the simple and clear solutions to exces-
sive company taxation practices suggested in the public
debate (making public the tax payments of MNEs, clos-
ing all tax loopholes, European cooperation). The cause
of this confusion is the complexity of the topic and
insufficient knowledge of the economics of taxation by
the general public. Instead, politicians often use simple
heuristics as an intuitive guide to a supposed optimal tax
policy. However, these intuitive suggestions can be con-
siderably flawed. The price of following those could be
substantial.
Note that the generality of the question posited requires
a general analysis. Without going into the details of the
corporate tax system, apart from the well-known charac-
teristics, I only address the greater picture, bypassing all
specific inaccuracies in the design of our current corpo-
rate tax system as well as the existing differences
between national tax systems. Unless otherwise men-
tioned, I presuppose in what follows that all countries
have a classical corporate tax system where only interest
on debt is tax deductible and foreign earnings are, in the
most optimistic case, taxed at a substantially lower effec-
tive tax rate compared with domestically earned income.
This simplification holds for most papers in the tax
competition literature, in which it is assumed that gov-
ernments are restricted to using source-based capital
income taxes. Within such a system, tax planning can be
achieved by smart use of transfer-pricing rules or com-
plicated financial structures or both. These practices
will not be discussed in detail here. Also, I use the terms
‘evasion’ and ‘avoidance’ interchangeably, as from an
economic point of view there is only a thin line between
legal and illegal use of the tax law to lower one’s tax bill.
The rest of the article discusses a number of steps that
can be taken in an attempt to answer the question of
what the welfare costs are of excessive company taxation
practices. To start with, in Section 1, I discuss the cru-
cial issue of the alternative tax system with which the
current system should be compared. To get an idea
about welfare costs, we need to structure our thoughts
about the ‘best’ possible alternative. This is the first
blank spot in the current policy discussion. Unfortu-
nately, the economic literature also is, to my knowledge,
still searching for the correct benchmark. Note the
importance of this point to the answer of the research
question posited at the start of this article. When the
best alternative changes shape, the welfare costs change
one-for-one. Thereafter, in Section 2, I discuss the clas-
sical tax competition literature because the most promi-
nent conclusion from this literature, a race to the bottom
6. See Dharmapala, above n. 5.
in company taxes, echoes in the public debate. Section 3
discusses a number of studies that have tried to quantify
the arguments raised in the classical tax competition lit-
erature. Thereafter, Section 4 is devoted to a recent
development in the tax competition literature that might
turn the debate upside down. Finally, Section 5 con-
cludes the discussion with some modest advice for poli-
cymakers.
2 With What Should Our
Current Tax System Be
Compared?
Before I can put a number on the welfare costs of exces-
sive behaviour, if it is possible at all, I need to discuss
the alternative with which we should compare our cur-
rent tax system. In other words, what is the optimal fea-
sible corporate tax system? Such a discussion is very
important as this is where the confusion between econo-
mists and the public originates.
First, the reader should remember that part of the
research effort of tax economists is invested in answer-
ing the question of how the government should design
its tax system such that public goods can be financed,
after-tax income is distributed equitably and the econo-
my is distorted as little as possible. The latter statement
implies that, in the absence of market failures, the gov-
ernment should try to minimise the influence of taxes
on individual choices.7 Second, economists regard firms
as being a (paper) representation of cooperation among
individuals. This leads to the insight that in the end not
firms but natural individuals pay taxes.8 Both issues are
crucial in the following discussion.
Economic analyses of tax systems can be categorised by
the assumptions that are made on the information set
available to the government.9 In the so-called first-best,
the government has perfect information. The govern-
ment observes an individual’s earnings ability (or inher-
ent talent), the actual income earned, how this income is
distributed over capital and labour, how the income is
spent and how the earnings ability is distributed over
society. This assumption makes the optimal equitable
tax system in the first-best very simple. The govern-
ment can just let each individual pay tax according to
7. See for an introduction into the discussion in this section amongst oth-
ers various chapters in J.E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector
(1999).
8. See amongst others A.J. Auerbach, ‘Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A
Review of What We Know’, 20 Tax Policy and the Economy, at 1-40
(2005).
9. The optimal corporate tax system is also discussed in pp. 876-869 in
A.J. Auerbach, M.P. Devereux & H. Simpson, ‘Taxing Corporate
Income’, in J.A. Mirrlees et al. (eds.), The Mirrlees Review. Dimensions
of Tax Design, ch. 9 (2010), at 837-913; R. Griffith, J. Hines & P.B.
Sørensen, ‘International Capital Taxation’, in Mirrlees et al., see above,
ch. 10, at 914-1027; and J. Mintz, ‘The Corporation Tax: A Survey’, 16
Fiscal Studies, at 23-68 (1995). Furthermore, R. de Mooij, ‘Will Corpo-
rate Income Taxation Survive’, 153 De Economist, at 277-301 (2005),
also mentions redistribution as an argument for corporate taxation.
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his or her (observed) ability to earn income, in such a
way that public goods can be financed and the distribu-
tion of after-tax income is equitable. Note that this
hypothetical tax bill is exogenous to the individual (a so-
called individualised lump sum transfer) and does not
depend on choices made by the individual; it is like the
talent-tax proposed by Jan Tinbergen.10 Such a tax sys-
tem, although it might seem immoral to some readers,
would not cause any distortions to the economy and
would reduce income inequality next to providing
finance for public goods.
Although highly stylised, this first-best is an interesting
benchmark: when individual earnings ability can be
taxed optimally, there is no role for the corporate tax,
and hence no welfare costs of excessive company taxa-
tion practices. The government can redistribute and
finance all it desires and therefore does not need to use a
corporate tax, which is regarded as highly distortionary
because of its influence on for example investments.11
The first-best also reveals a second important lesson: in
‘simple’ economic models, it is never a goal of govern-
ment policy to tax firms for revenue. Here, ‘simple’ is
used in the sense that there are no market failures that
lead to an argument for Pigouvian taxes and assuming
there are no administrative cost savings achievable from
taxing firms instead of individuals. The latter can surely
be an argument for an indirect tax on individuals via
firms.12 Some might argue that it might be optimal to
use a corporate tax because part of the incidence is on
immobile rents. However, immobile rents are, by defini-
tion, related to a location such that the government
could use a local property tax as well for such a policy
goal.
Now let us constrain the information set of the govern-
ment. Economists define the second-best as the case
where the government cannot observe all relevant char-
acteristics of an individual’s ability to earn income.
Instead, it observes the next best thing: individual
income from capital and labour. Before moving on, I
must stress that I assume in the rest of the article that
taxing individual capital income is in principle desirable
and helpful in redistributing income. There is a huge
literature on this topic that I do not want to repeat
10. J. Tinbergen, ‘Belasting op Bekwaamheid’, 30 Intermediair, at 1-3
(1970).
11. See for evidence on the economic distortions of the corporate tax: A.
Johansson, C. Heady, J. Arnold, B. Brys & L. Vartia, ‘Taxation and Eco-
nomic Growth’, OECD Economics Department Working Paper (2009).
In the text, I ignore arguments for taxing foreigners with the corporate
tax for simplicity. In this simple set-up, and assuming capital is perfectly
mobile, the government can only impose and enforce a lump sum tax
on foreigners when the resulting after-tax average rate of return upon
investing in the country is not below the after-tax average return that
can be obtained abroad.
12. See for an excellent discussion for example pp. 876-869 in Auerbach et
al., above n. 9.
here.13 When capital income should not be taxed at all,
the case for the corporate tax is obviously very weak.
Let us focus, therefore, on the case where individual
capital income should be taxed. When the government
can tax both individual capital and labour income, it is
hard to see why a corporate tax is needed at all. The
resulting residence-based capital tax system has the
attractive feature that it leaves the allocation of invest-
ment unaffected: it would result in capital export neu-
trality. This is because for the investor it does not
matter where in the world its money is invested, the
effective tax rate is always the domestic personal tax
rate.14 In such a setting, a corporate tax might be opti-
mal only when we can think of cases where the profits of
firms give a credible signal of the earnings ability of the
underlying (domestic) investors, which is different from
the signal obtained from their capital income itself – for
example, when high-ability individuals invest (partly) in
better-performing firms and this effect is not already
accounted for by taxing the higher capital incomes (one
can imagine that a linear tax on capital income cannot
perfectly tax a hypothetical optimal non-linear capital
earnings profile). Only in such a case might the corpo-
rate tax help in redistributing income. I have not come
across such an analysis in the literature yet. In most
studies, investment portfolios are assumed to be perfect-
ly diversified such that everybody earns the same aver-
age return. To conclude, it is difficult to see why a cor-
porate tax, next to a normal tax on capital income,
would be needed in the second-best, and hence exces-
sive tax planning does not reduce welfare apart from the
resources used for this practice.
But most economists and tax lawyers will agree that
even this second-best is not realistic. Two arguments
can be given. First, the government does not have suffi-
cient information to verify the capital income that all its
citizens earn somewhere in the world, that is, it cannot
effectively tax all capital income at the personal level.
When the opportunity to evade or avoid the capital
income tax is correlated with the ability to pay taxes,
and investors prefer to invest at least some of their
income in their home country, the corporate tax as a
withholding tax assists in achieving equity. It makes
sure that at least the income earned at source is (partly)
taxed before it has the opportunity to be shifted around
the world.
The qualifying conditions here are interesting by them-
selves. When all individuals evade and avoid to the same
relative extent, it is not entirely clear that a corporate tax
is helpful in redistributing income. With respect to the
second qualifying condition, we need that at least some
13. See amongst others G.N. Mankiw, M. Weinzierl & D. Yagan, ‘Optimal
Taxation in Theory and Practice’, 23 Journal of Economic Perspectives,
at 147-174 (2009); P.A. Diamond and E. Saez, ‘The Case for a Progres-
sive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations’, 25 Journal
of Economic Perspectives, at 165-190 (2011); J. Banks and P.A. Dia-
mond, ‘The Base for Direct Taxation’, in Mirrlees et al., above n. 9, ch.
6, at 548-648; and B. Jacobs, ‘From Optimal Tax Theory to Applied Tax
Policy’, 69 Finanz Archiv, at 338-389 (2013), for an introduction into
this discussion.
14. See for a discussion pp. 923-929 in Griffith et al., above n. 9.
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of the more able invest in their home country, otherwise
there will be nothing to redistribute. However, one
might claim that the revenues from foreigners serve as a
good substitute in case all rich citizens invest abroad. At
the other extreme, when all individuals invest at home, a
correctly designed withholding tax on corporate income
is equivalent to a personal capital tax and is therefore a
good instrument to redistribute income.
A second argument for the corporate tax is that the gov-
ernment does not have sufficient information to perfect-
ly distinguish between labour income and capital
income for certain individuals. Therefore, the corporate
tax systems of most countries try to equalise the net tax
burden of small incorporated firms with the tax burden
that the owners would face when they would not be
incorporated. This is labelled the ‘backstop function’ of
the corporate tax system. When the corporate tax is
absent, everybody can try to find a way to be defined as
a corporation for the tax law, leading to an erosion of the
tax revenue, and the redistributive function of the
income tax system.15
Both considerations, the corporate tax assists in redis-
tribution and serves as a ‘backstop,’ are fundamental to
the discussion in this article because they make clear
that the corporate tax is important only because the gov-
ernment is constrained in the information it has con-
cerning the ability to pay of its citizens. To my knowl-
edge, only a limited number of papers have addressed
the imperfect information aspect of corporate taxation.16
Furthermore, the discussion stresses that the only argu-
ment for having the corporate tax is equity. In my opin-
ion, all models not including these issues should be
interpreted with care. As we will discover further on,
this implies that only a few papers in the literature give
us some guidance in figuring out the welfare costs of
excessive company taxation practices. And these few
papers do not provide a clear and coherent view.17
Note that even when the reader believes that the above
discussion is only semantic such that one can simply
bypass the philosophical question as to why we need a
corporate tax and that only revenue from firms matters,
he or she should realise that even in this case it might be
optimal to differentiate the tax system between mobile
15. See amongst others A.J. Weichenrieder, ‘(Why) Do We Need Corporate
Taxation?’, CESifo Working Paper No. 1495 (2005); and R.A. de Mooij
and G. Nicodeme, ‘Corporate Tax Policy and Incorporation in the Euro-
pean Union’, 15 International Tax and Public Finance, at 478-498
(2008).
16. See P. Osmundsen, K.P. Hagen & G. Schjelderup, ‘Internationally
Mobile Firms and Tax Policy’, 45 Journal of International Economics, at
97-113 (1995); and J. Becker and C. Fuest, ‘Optimal Tax Policy When
Firms Are Internationally Mobile’, 18 International Tax and Public
Finance, at 580-604 (2011).
17. Other arguments sometimes mentioned are that the corporate tax can
be used to export part of the tax burden and that it serves as a ‘benefit-
tax’. The former argument is certainly important from a unilateral point
of view, but can hardly be seen as optimal from a global welfare-maxi-
mising point of view. The latter argument is dismissed by Weichenried-
er, above n. 15 and Mintz, above n. 8. Mintz rightly claims that: ‘[…]
there are often other better targeted instruments available for internal-
izing the cost of providing public inputs’. Both arguments are therefore
not further pursued here. See Weichenrieder, above n. 16; and Mintz,
above n. 8, at 23-68.
and immobile firms,18 where the mobile firms should be
taxed at a substantially lower rate than immobile firms.
This is an application of the Ramsey inverse elasticity
rule. The immobility signals that individuals are not
willing or able to circumvent the tax and, hence, the
economic distortion caused by such a tax is rather low:
the immobile firms will remain in the same location,
supply a similar quantity of products and demand a sim-
ilar quantity of production factors. See Section 5 for a
further discussion.
3 The Classical Tax
Competition Model: Where
Is the Tax Planning?
Having introduced the economics of the corporate tax,
we can now continue with discussing the classical tax
competition literature. Following the seminal works of
C.M. Tiebout, W.E. Oates and many others, the classi-
cal tax competition model was established in a number
of articles in the mid-1980s by some influential writers
like P. Mieskowsky, J.D. Wilson and G.R. Zodrow.19 In
this model it is assumed that there exist a number of
identical countries populated with citizens who are also
all identical.20 These citizens work within the firms in
the country, and they invest all their capital in the inter-
national capital market, implying that capital is (perfect-
ly) mobile across countries. The firms are also all identi-
cal. The governments are assumed to tax this capital
income at source to obtain sufficient tax revenue for the
financing of the public good that their citizens desire.
Note that when capital is taxed, it will leave the country
until the point where the demand for capital in the
country has increased by enough to generate after-tax
returns that are equivalent to the return that can be
earned abroad. Typically, it is assumed that the capital
tax is the only tax instrument that the government pos-
sesses; it cannot use lump sum transfers but is forced to
use the distortionary source-based tax on capital. As
mentioned before, such lump sum transfers are simple
unconditional payments from the citizens to the govern-
ment, unconditional meaning that the payment does not
depend on individual choices. Such lump sum transfers
18. See M. Keen, ‘Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less
Harmful’, 54 National Tax Journal, at 757-762 (2001). This topic is
more fully discussed at the end of the article.
19. See for classical references J.D. Wilson, ‘A Theory of Interregional Tax
Competition’, 19 Journal of Urban Economics, at 296-315 (1986); and
G.R. Zodrow and P. Mieszkowsky, ‘Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation,
and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods’, 19 Journal of Urban
Economics, at 356-370 (1986). Excellent reviews of the literature are
given in Wilson, above n. 3; Zodrow, above n. 3 and Keen and Konrad,
above n. 3.
20. Please realise that economists are aware of the simplicity of such an
assumption. The goal is not to be entirely accurate but to make the
model simple enough to only capture the essence of a discussion such
that arguments can be checked for logical consistency. Later on, a mod-
el can be adjusted to include additional arguments that might be impor-
tant.
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are a superior financing instrument. Allowing the gov-
ernment in the model to use it would imply zero optimal
capital taxes. Instead, the government in the model is
forced to use the distortionary capital tax in such a way
that the welfare of its own citizens is maximised.21 This
assumption implies that the tax imposes a positive exter-
nality upon other countries: if the tax is increased, capi-
tal flows to neighbouring countries, yielding both extra
tax revenues and higher wages abroad. The home gov-
ernment does not take this positive effect of a tax
increase into account. Hence, as is always the case with
positive externalities, governments decide on a tax rate
that is too low from a global welfare point of view, and
subsequently all countries together have tax revenues
and public expenditures that are too low from a global
welfare point of view. The smaller the country, or the
more countries in the world, the lower the tax rate.22
This is the first crucial characteristic of classical tax
competition models; tax rates and public revenues are
too low owing to the existence of this positive spillover.
If Europe were such a simple world, everybody would
be made better off by EU-wide cooperation. However,
this positive effect of cooperation is unambiguous only
under the assumption of symmetry. Complications arise
when the model is extended. First, when asymmetries
between countries are introduced, for example differen-
ces in size, some countries tend to gain (the large coun-
tries) and others tend to lose from cooperation (the
small countries).23 Next to size, countries might also dif-
fer in for example endowments or productivity.24 On
the other hand, when asymmetries between countries
exist, tax competition tends to distort the allocation of
capital between countries. This implies that tax coordi-
nation has the potential for improving welfare by
improving the allocation of capital across countries. Sec-
ond, note that in the equilibrium of a symmetric classi-
cal tax competition model, there are no net capital
importers or exporters: the symmetry between the
countries implies that all governments choose exactly
the same tax rate, so there is no reason to invest abroad.
When in richer models cross-ownership of assets occurs,
21. Some papers do not pay attention to public goods and welfare, see for
example R. Kanbur and M. Keen, ‘Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competi-
tion and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size’, 83 American
Economic Review at 877-892 (1993); these studies simply assume that
the government wants to maximise its own tax revenues. We will see
later that this makes a great difference in evaluating optimal tax policy.
Also, it is crucial to note that the government cares about its own pay-
off alone; if the government cared about the payoff of other countries,
tax competition would be less of a problem.
22. See amongst others W. Hoyt, ‘Property Taxation, Nash Equilibrium and
Market Power’, 30 Journal of Urban Economics, at 123-131 (1991).
23. See S. Bucovetsky, ‘Asymmetric Tax Competition’, 30 Journal of Urban
Economics, at 167-181 (1991); and J.D. Wilson, ‘Tax Competition with
Interregional Differences in Factor Endowments’, 21 Regional Science
and Urban Economics, at 423-451 (1991).
24. See for example S. Peralta and T. van Ypersele, ‘Factor Endowments
and Welfare Levels in an Asymmetric Tax Competition Game’, Journal
of Urban Economics, at 258-274 (2005); and S. Peralta and T. van
Ypersele, ‘Coordination of Capital Taxation Among Asymmetric Coun-
tries’, 36 Regional Science and Urban Economics, at 708-726 (2006).
this gives rise to a negative spillover.25 The reduction in
well-being of the foreigner when its investments are
being taxed by the home government is not taken into
account, such that the home government has a tendency
to set a tax rate that is too high. Third, in the classical
tax competition model, the total amount of capital is
fixed; it only migrates between countries. When instead
it is assumed that the total tax base can become either
larger or smaller in response to changes in the effective
level of capital taxation in the world, for example
because individuals adjust their savings, it follows that
the gains from tax coordination decrease.26 Increasing
the average level of taxation now reduces the total tax
base, which causes a reduction in tax revenue.
Until now we have focused on coordinating the full cor-
porate tax system, tax base and rate, all harmonised.
The expected gains from weaker forms of cooperation
are much smaller. For example, when one tax instru-
ment is not included in the agreement, competition
tends to intensify on this instrument. An example is the
attempt by the EC to coordinate only the tax base, leav-
ing the decision on tax rates to the discretion of the indi-
vidual Member States. Also, when some countries do
not join the cooperation agreement, the gains for the
remaining countries are reduced.27
Despite all caveats, the models and results discussed
above show that under reasonable parameter values, tax
competition leads to tax rates that are too low such that
a coordinated increase to some degree can raise welfare.
I will label this the strong result from the classical tax
competition literature in the remainder of this article.
Although the models discussed above are not tailor-
made to capture excessive tax planning by firms, or
excessive tax-setting strategies by governments, this
strong result does resonate in the public debate regard-
ing these topics.28 The model describes optimal govern-
ment behaviour in the case of a mobile tax base that
moves to another country. This acts as a mirror image to
models that study taxation in a closed economy where
individuals being taxed just redirect their effort into
activities that are taxed less heavily – that is, there is
nothing ‘excessive’ or ‘immoral’ in the model, just indi-
viduals behaving optimally.
Besides this remark, the reader must realise that this
strong result is an optimistic result. It is fundamentally
based upon the assumption that the government intends
to maximise welfare. When the government does not
25. See amongst others H. Huizinga and S.B. Nielsen, ‘Capital Income and
Profit Taxation with Foreign Ownership of Firms’, 42 Journal of Inter-
national Economics, at 149-165 (1997).
26. See amongst others I.W.H. Parry, ‘How Large Are the Welfare Costs of
Tax Competition?’, 54 Journal of Urban Economics, at 39-60 (2003).
27. I will not pursue this discussion further here, but refer the interested
reader to H. Vrijburg, ‘50 Years of European Union Corporate Income
Tax Harmonization Initiatives: Is Enhanced Cooperation the Solution?’,
in D.A. Albregtse and P. Kavelaars (eds.), Naar een Europese Winstbe-
lasting? (2010).
28. See also J. Slemrod and J.D. Wilson, ‘Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax
Havens’, 93 Journal of Public Economics, at 1265 (2009), for a similar
remark.
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intend to maximise welfare, tax competition might in
fact improve welfare.29
If the government does not have welfare in mind when
it chooses its tax rate, it ignores the distortionary effect
of the tax on welfare and hence chooses tax rates that are
too high from a welfare perspective in the absence of
competitive pressure. The government might for exam-
ple be distracted from welfare by collecting revenue to
finance projects that are valued highly by the politicians
themselves but not necessarily by the citizens. Admit-
tedly, this idea, which comes from the public choice lit-
erature on Leviathan governments by Brennan and
Buchanan, adheres to a very dark view of government.30
On the other hand, it is often the case that government
sets a target of maximising tax revenues from corporate
taxes. One can understand such an approach when rec-
ognising that welfare might be a problematic concept to
quantify such that aiming for maximum tax revenues
might be an ‘acceptable’ simple heuristic that guides
governments in practice. When this is the case, howev-
er, the natural state of government might well be to
‘over-tax’. Tax competition constrains this natural state.
A further shortcoming is that the discussion from Sec-
tion 3 hardly appears anywhere in the classical tax com-
petition literature. The models assume rather ad hoc
that capital taxes should be used instead of this being a
deliberate choice of the governments. This is a funda-
mental shortcoming. Governments can always use lump
sum transfers to finance their expenditures. Distortion-
ary taxes should be used only to achieve some other pol-
icy goal next to revenues.31 Labour taxes are used to
redistribute income: tax those with a higher ability to
earn income more than individuals with a lower ability.
Excise taxes are used to internalise some externality, for
example in the case of smoking and alcohol. From the
same argument, corporate taxes are used not because
they yield tax revenues but precisely because they assist
in redistributing income (see the discussion on the back-
stop function in Section 3). So, besides not modelling
excessive tax setting and tax planning, the papers dis-
cussed above do not model the contribution of corpo-
rate/capital taxes to the tax system. Therefore, the wel-
fare losses of tax competition might not show up in
eroding tax revenues, but in too little income redistribu-
tion.32
In recent years, scholars have modelled more realistic
corporate tax systems in which governments not only
choose source-based capital tax rates, but can, for exam-
ple, also manipulate the definition of the tax base by set-
29. See J. Edwards and M. Keen, ‘Tax Competition and the Leviathan’, 40
European Economic Review, at 113-134 (1996).
30. G. Brennan and J.M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Analytical Founda-
tions of a Fiscal Constitution (1980).
31. See amongst others B. Jacobs, A Contribution to the Theory of the
Marginal Cost of Public Funds (2013).
32. See H.W. Sinn, ‘How Much Europe? Subsidiarity, Centralization and Fis-
cal Competition’, 41 Scottish Journal of Political Economy, at 85-107
(1994).
ting the fraction of capital costs that is tax-deductible.33
Furthermore, firms are allowed to shift not only invest-
ments but also profits across borders. Besides develop-
ing the model, empirical evidence is found that supports
the tax competition hypothesis.34 However, despite
these improvements, these models typically still do not
address the issues raised in Section 3, and the corporate
tax system is imposed rather ad hoc, which is common
practice in the literature. The models are used to study
questions related to the issue of replacing Separate
Accounting with Formula Apportionment.35 Interest-
ingly, profit shifting is (partly) prohibited under the lat-
ter system in the models used. Although not addressing
the specific role of the corporate tax, the main finding of
these papers is interesting: reducing opportunities to
profit shifting does not lead to an unambiguous welfare
gain. The following section will explore this topic a bit
further as these models, or the arguments developed
within these models, have been used for simulation
studies.




In this section, I provide some numbers that give an
idea of the potential benefits of tax coordination. After
the so-called Bolkestein report by the EC in 2001, a
number of simulation studies have been performed by
two groups of economists.36 The first group is centred
around the Danish economist Sørensen and the research
institute Copenhagen Economics, while the second
group is related to the Dutch Bureau for Economic Poli-
cy Analysis (CPB) using a model that is in part built
upon an early version of the model used by Sørensen.37
To my knowledge the papers cited below are still the
scientific frontier on this topic.38 Both groups of econo-
mists constructed an own Computable General Equilib-
rium model with considerable detail. Computable Gen-
33. See for an early approach, A. Haufler and G. Schjelderup, ‘Corporate
Tax Systems and Cross-Country Profit Shifting’, 30 Oxford Economic
Papers, at 123-131 (2001).
34. See M. Devereux, B. Lockwood & M. Redoano, ‘Do Countries Compete
Over Corporate Tax Rates?’, 92 Journal of Public Economics, at
1210-1235 (2008).
35. See amongst others N. Riedel and M. Runkel, ‘Company Tax Reform
with a Water’s Edge’, 91 Journal of Public Economics, at 1533-1554
(2007); S.B. Nielsen, P.R. Raimondos-Moller & G. Schjelderup, ‘Compa-
ny Taxation and Tax Spillovers: Separate Accounting Versus Formula
Apportionment’, 54 European Economic Review, at 121-132 (2010);
and T. Eichner and M. Runkel, ‘Corporate Income Taxation of Multina-
tionals in a General Equilibrium Model’, 95 Journal of Public Economics,
at 723-733 (2011).
36. European Commission, ‘Company Taxation in the Internal Market,
Commission Staff Working Paper, COM(2001) 582, 2001.
37. See P.B. Sørensen, ‘Company Tax Reform in the European Union’, 11
International Tax and Public Finance, at 91-115 (2004).
38. See Vrijburg, above n. 27, for a more detailed discussion.
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eral Equilibrium models make assumptions on the pro-
duction process in the economy, the consumption pref-
erences of consumers, the objective function of the gov-
ernment and the resource allocation across consumers.
Furthermore, a whole range of taxes is introduced to
study the effects of changes in these taxes on welfare.
Typically, these models are too complex to be solved
analytically, and hence simulations are used.
A first set of studies by Sørensen incorporates the main
arguments from the tax competition literature discussed
above into a model that is complex but analytically solv-
able.39 This is achieved by not modelling individual
countries, but four aggregate country groups (the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Northern Europe, Continental Europe
and the United States). He assumes that the govern-
ment in each of these blocks intends to maximise welfare
by deciding over two tax instruments (a tax on capital
and a tax on labour), a lump sum transfer, a public good
that enhances domestic productivity and a normal pub-
lic good. Interestingly, Sørensen does allow for lump
sum transfers, implying that the tax on capital income is
motivated by something other than just revenue. This is
achieved by modelling citizens who are heterogeneous
in their wealth and earnings ability, introducing a redis-
tributive motive for the government. Both the tax on
capital and the tax on labour are used to redistribute.
Citizens supply labour and savings to the domestic
labour market and international capital market, respec-
tively. Both the total supply of labour and the total sup-
ply of capital are endogenous. Production occurs by
combining domestically supplied labour with capital
attracted from the international capital market and some
fixed input. Part of the production process is owned by
foreigners, and, likewise, some foreign production is
owned by domestic citizens. The government taxes
labour income (or consumption) and levies a source-
based tax on the total return to capital (profits and nor-
mal return). The revenues are used to finance the trans-
fers to all citizens, the previously mentioned productive
public good and a normal public good. The equilibrium
of the model is a so-called Nash equilibrium, where
none of the countries wants to adjust its tax or expendi-
ture policy given the choices made by the other govern-
ments.
This implies that all arguments mentioned in Section 3
are present in the model. To compute the welfare gain
of tax coordination, the model parameters are chosen
such that the equilibrium tax rates under tax competi-
tion equal the observed effective tax rates in the real
world. In equilibrium, the (net) international spillovers
are positive, implying too little redistribution under tax
competition. Following this observation, Sørensen com-
putes a small welfare gain from EU-wide coordination
(0.10-0.32% of GDP) that is asymmetric across coun-
tries and across the population; the poorest individuals
39. See P.B. Sørensen, ‘The Case for International Tax Co-ordination
Reconsidered’, 31 Economic Policy, at 429-472 (2000); and P.B.
Sørensen, ‘International Tax Coordination: Regionalism Versus Global-
ism’, 88 Journal of Public Economics, at 1187-1214 (2004).
gain the most.40 The welfare gain comes from higher
transfers to the poor financed by higher capital tax rates
in the cooperating countries, which is possible because
escaping the tax is more difficult for investors when a
large number of countries raise their tax rate. Further-
more, the higher capital tax rates are used to finance a
reduction in labour income taxes, which boosts labour
supply. Competition in capital tax rates is partly
replaced by more competition in productive infrastruc-
ture, but this effect is minor. The welfare gain obtained
from this model should be compared with the estimated
welfare effects of previous and anticipated EU action,
which are in the range of 0.5-1.9% of GDP.41 The wel-
fare gain computed by Sørensen is therefore at the lower
end.
A second class of simulation studies adds more institu-
tional detail: either all EU countries or all OECD coun-
tries are modelled.42 The price to be paid for this insti-
tutional detail is that government policy is exogenous (is
changed from outside the model), as opposed to the
model by Sørensen where government policy is endoge-
nous (determined by optimal policy rules that are a
function of the model parameters). This is a necessary
restriction because strategic games between a large
number of asymmetric players cannot be solved analyti-
cally. This is not an innocent assumption, because, typi-
cally, governments will respond to an exogenously
imposed constraint by changing another tax instrument
such that the previous policy goal can still partly be ach-
ieved via a detour. As opposed to the model discussed
above, these more detailed models include a more fully
fledged financial system where both bonds and equity
are traded, two types of firms (domestic firms and
MNEs with subsidiaries in all other countries). Two
distinct channels now operate. Capital can be reallocated
to circumvent capital taxes, as in the Sørensen model,
but profit also can be shifted across countries such that
the effective tax rates on capital are lowered (using both
transfer pricing and debt financing). The authors have
subsequently tried to match the tax parameters in the
model as closely as possible to the observed tax policies
within the EU.
Several reforms are studied in these detailed models.
First, a minimum CIT rate of 33%, the EU-average at
the time of writing.43 The reform is budget-neutral,
which is ensured by changing the labour income tax
40. More egalitarian countries gain more because they value the extra
redistribution more, countries with a higher share of pure profits gain
more because they raise more extra revenue, capital importers gain
more because they benefit more from the reduction in the net interest
rate.
41. See G. Nicodeme, ‘Corporate Tax Competition and Coordination in the
European Union: What Do We Know? Where Do We stand?’, MPRA
Working Paper No. 107 (2006).
42. Not discussed in this review owing to limited space, but certainly inter-
esting as well are the papers by J. Brøchner, J. Jensen, P. Svensson &
P.B. Sørensen, ‘The Dilemmas of Tax Coordination in the Enlarged
European Union’, Working Paper No. 1859 (2006); and Sørensen,
above n. 37.
43. L. Bettendrof, J. Gorter & A. van der Horst, ‘Who Benefits from Tax
Competition in the European Union’, CPB Discussion Paper No. 125
(2006).
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accordingly. Six EU countries, at the time of the study,
should have raised their tax rate to comply with this
minimum rate. On average, welfare hardly changes, and
GDP goes down by 0.1% owing to an increase in the
marginal effective capital tax rate. This distorts capital
investments into the countries that are forced to increase
their tax rate. Thereafter, the authors study the case
where all countries are forced to adjust their tax rates to
the EU-average. In this case, there is no welfare gain:
the gains of the winners are as large as the losses of the
losers. There is slightly more investment, but GDP
decreases owing to increases in the labour income tax.
Typically, countries with a higher initial tax gain rela-
tive to countries with a low initial tax, implying that
being forced to increase the distortionary corporate tax
is painful.
A subsequent paper studies the introduction of a Com-
mon Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) with-
in the previously mentioned model.44 The CCCTB
defines common tax base rules and replaces Separate
Accounting by a Consolidated Tax Base that prohibits
profit shifting. The consolidated tax base is allocated to
the different countries using a formula involving labour,
capital and production. Countries with a narrow tax
base are forced to broaden their tax base, and vice versa
for countries with a broad tax base. Broadening the tax
base typically leads to more revenues and a reduction in
investment because capital is taxed more at the margin
owing to base broadening. Narrowing the tax base leads
to a reduction in tax revenues and more investments
because of the reversed argument. Interesting for the
present article is that welfare hardly changes by intro-
ducing the CCCTB (increase of 0.02% of GDP in the
base case) because tax planning is replaced by real factor
reallocation. From this, it can be concluded that the tax-
planning activities do not substantially harm welfare in
the model, whereas the factor reallocations do! To be
precise, the authors state: ‘[…] transfer pricing allevi-
ates the tax burden for MNEs, and is therefore good for
growth’. A gain in tax compliance, assumed to be
around 10% of tax revenues based on scarce empirical
evidence, ensures that welfare does not deteriorate fol-
lowing the introduction of the CCCTB. Low-tax coun-
tries tend to gain from the CCCTB because MNEs shift
production to these countries. In a number of follow-up
papers using the same model, the conclusion that the
CCCTB does not substantially increase welfare is found
to be robust.45
The above discussion highlights a number of important
conclusions. First, large Computable General Equilibri-
um models cannot find a substantial welfare gain from
44. L. Bettendorf, A. van der Horst & H. Rojas-Romagosa, ‘Will Corporate
Tax Consolidation Improve Efficiency in the European Union?’, Tinber-
gen Institute Discussion Paper No. 07-076/2 (2007).
45. See L. Bettendorf, A. van der Horst, R.A. de Mooij & H. Vrijburg, ‘Cor-
porate Tax Consolidation and Enhanced Cooperation in the European
Union’, 31 Fiscal Studies, at 453-479 (2010); and L. Bettendorf, M.P.
Devereux, A. van der Horst, S. Loretz & R.A. de Mooij, ‘Corporate Tax
Harmonization in the European Union’, 25 Economic Policy, at 537-590
(2010). See for further discussion Vrijburg, above n. 27.
coordinative action in the EU. However, some remarks
must be made. First of all, the studies by Sørensen do
not allow for tax planning. The welfare gain comes from
the strong tax competition result mentioned in the pre-
vious section, so undertaxation is resolved. This, how-
ever, is not the topic of this article. The models with
more institutional detail do allow for multinational firms
that engage in profit-shifting activities to lower their tax
bill. However, besides being unable to find a welfare
gain, these models lack a ‘backstop function’, implying
that it is impossible to judge how either tax competition
or tax coordination affects the redistributive function of
the tax system; it just reports the sum of the change in
economic distortions. But, as claimed in Section 2,
when this is the true policy goal, why not just abandon
the corporate tax altogether?
5 Tax Competition Model with
Tax Planning: Are Tax
Havens Parasitic or Useful?
We continue our search for the welfare costs of exces-
sive company taxation practices with the discussion of
two recent papers: Slemrod and Wilson (2009) show
that ‘excessive tax planning’ lowers welfare, whereas
Hong and Smart (2010) show that tax havens might
raise welfare.46 I will discuss both and identify the cru-
cial difference in assumption. Finally, I relate the result
to the literature on preferential versus non-preferential
tax regimes.
Similar to the classical tax competition model, Slemrod
and Wilson model a large number of countries. As
opposed to the classical tax competition model, firms are
modelled slightly different, some are now allowed to
engage in tax planning. Slemrod and Wilson assume
that each unit of capital represents a firm. All firms are
identical except for upfront costs that need to be incur-
red in order to be able to avoid taxes via a tax haven: the
‘participation costs’. These tax havens are supposed to
be small countries that supply ‘concealment services’ to
firms. These concealment services can be used to under-
report taxable income, be it legal or illegal. The price of
these services depends on the demand for the services
by firms: the more avoidance is demanded, the higher
the price. One can interpret the sum of both the partici-
pation costs and the total amount paid for concealment
services as the reward paid to the legal and accounting
sector for computing the optimal tax strategy. Also, the
instrument set of the government is widened. Besides
choosing a tax rate, the government can now also invest
in enforcing the tax code. For each firm that participates
46. Slemrod and Wilson, above n 28; and Q. Hong and M. Smart, ‘In Praise
of Tax Havens: International Tax Planning and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment’, 54 European Economic Review, at 82-95 (2010). See for a fur-
ther introduction into this discussion D. Dharmapala, ‘What Problems
and Opportunities Are Created by Tax Havens?’, 24 Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, at 661-679 (2009).
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in a tax haven, the share of taxable income that can be
shielded increases when more concealment services are
bought, whereas it declines when the government
undertakes more enforcement activities.
Given all cost parameters, the tax rate and the level of
enforcement decided on by the government, a number
of firms (not all of them) decide to engage in excessive
tax planning. A small thought experiment reveals that
an increase in the statutory tax rate would lead to an
increase in the demand for concealment services and an
increase in the number of firms that engage in excessive
tax planning. This is because the higher statutory tax
rate makes participating in avoidance more attractive.
The revenue effect of both more concealment and more
avoidance must be compensated with a further increase
in the tax rate. Compared with an otherwise identical
classical tax competition model, the costs associated
with these newly introduced tax-planning activities low-
er the effective rate of return on capital within the coun-
try. This results in an outflow of capital and a larger
excess burden: welfare decreases. Note that compared
with the standard tax competition model, the welfare
costs in Slemrod and Wilson’s model come from both a
statutory tax rate that is too high and resources invested
in activities that are intrinsically useless from a social
point of view (tax planning). Preventing firms from
using the tax havens would imply that the government
could save on enforcement costs, firms could save on the
expenditures into concealment services and the govern-
ment would receive more tax revenues. These extra rev-
enues would allow the government to slightly reduce the
tax rate, which also reduces the total excess burden from
taxation.
A second lesson from Slemrod and Wilson is that also
partially eliminating tax havens is welfare-improving.47
This is because the decrease in the supply of conceal-
ment services will cause a higher price for these services
such that the government can save on enforcement costs
for obtaining the same revenue. The price of conceal-
ment services has a similar effect on firm choices as gov-
ernment enforcement spending. Furthermore, Slemrod
and Wilson explain a new externality arising in such a
model. Countries would jointly benefit from a coordina-
ted reduction in enforcement activities; this would
increase the price of concealment services, which would
endogenously constrain tax planning. An individual
country is too small to have an effect on this price, but
jointly countries would have such an effect (a coordina-
ted increase in the tax rate has a similar effect). All in
all, it is worthwhile to reduce tax-planning opportuni-
ties through coordination.
The conclusion from Slemrod and Wilson (2009) con-
flicts with the conclusion from Hong and Smart (2010),
who conclude that tax planning is welfare improving.
47. The process of partially reducing tax havens, and the strategy to follow,
is an interesting research topic in itself. See M. Elsayyad and K.A. Kon-
rad, ‘Fighting Multiple Tax Havens’, 86 Journal of International Eco-
nomics, at 295-305 (2012), who show that removing tax havens might
reduce welfare when it relaxes competition between the remaining tax
havens.
Hong and Smart differentiate from the classical tax
competition model by assuming that there are two types
of capital, domestic and international. Domestic capital
is owned by domestic entrepreneurs, whereas interna-
tional capital is owned by the public. The key insight is
that the government cannot observe the difference
between the two (recognise a third-best approach) and
therefore has to tax both the same. Such a constraint on
the ability of the government to tax is often related to a
political constraint, for example when the government
cannot explain to the public that it partially refrains
from taxing international firms. Besides this deviation
from the classical tax competition model, a fundamental
difference with respect to Slemrod and Wilson is the
assumption that the government wants to redistribute
from domestic entrepreneurs to workers. This introdu-
ces, in my opinion, the fundamental role of the corpo-
rate tax into the discussion: it assists in redistributing
income. Furthermore, the government does not care
inherently about the owners of international capital. In
their own words: ‘[…] the corporate tax is a devise for
domestic, not international redistribution, so that reve-
nue losses due to income shifting have no direct effect
on welfare’.
Domestic capital cannot escape taxation, whereas inter-
national capital can, and such an outflow of capital in
part hurts domestic workers because they have less capi-
tal to work with, implying lower wages. This essentially
clarifies their findings. The government is not after tax-
ing international capital at all: it would rather leave it
unaffected or even subsidise it. Hence, the government
welcomes all opportunities for a reduction of the effec-
tive rate of taxation on international capital, while it can
still levy a high tax on domestic entrepreneurs to finance
transfers to the working population. Tax avoidance
offers that opportunity. As a result of tax planning, the
government can redistribute more from domestic entre-
preneurs towards domestic labourers.48 In an extension,
Hong and Smart consider some costs associated with tax
planning and conclude that in this case some restrictions
on tax planning might be needed. But still, a complete
elimination is surely undesirable.
What can be thought about these two conflicting
results? At first sight, the argument from Hong and
Smart seems trivial. They model ad hoc a group of
entrepreneurs that is immobile and relatively rich. Tax-
ing this group to finance a transfer to the poor obviously
raises welfare. But such a comment downgrades their
fundamental insight that highlights an important defi-
ciency in the classical tax competition model (and there-
fore in the model of Slemrod and Wilson). In this classi-
cal tax competition model, the government, in essence,
wants to tax all firms the same as all firms are inherently
identical. Note also that Slemrod and Wilson model
homogeneous firms that only differ by some unex-
plained random cost parameter that makes some firms
48. This is not a pure Pareto improvement as domestic entrepreneurs would
be better off with a lower tax on their earnings. However, the redistrib-
utive preferences of the government more than compensate this loss.
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better in tax planning than others. Still, if the govern-
ment had perfect information, it would like to tax all
these firms using the same uniform capital tax to obtain
the desired level of tax revenue (assuming that a lump
sum transfer is not available). Therefore, all anomalies
that imply higher statutory tax rates or less revenue
from this uniform collection of firms will lead to lower
welfare. Whereas Hong and Smart model an ad hoc
equity argument leading to a seemingly straightforward
result, Slemrod and Wilson assume that all firms are
identical, and by doing so assume that the government is
indifferent towards taxing the various firms from redis-
tributive arguments (interpreting the public good as
redistribution in this case). On the other hand, Hong
and Smart only slightly address the central argument
from Slemrod and Wilson: the resources misused for
tax-planning activities. Also, Hong and Smart take an
extreme position in the availability of avoidance technol-
ogy: only the international firms can avoid. This is in
contrast to Slemrod and Wilson, who assume that all
firms have the same probability to avoid.
These two models show that the welfare effects of
excessive company taxation practices are not straightfor-
ward, but depend crucially on two questions. First, the
magnitude of resources lost in the process of tax plan-
ning. When the government really should intend to tax
firms at a certain level, activities that undermine this are
just a social loss. But one should also keep in mind that
enforcing tax codes might cost valuable resources, and
the alternative use of these resources should be taken
into account. Next to that, an equally important ques-
tion is, how large are the marginal social gains from tax-
ing the profits of a particular firm? When all firms are
identical, these gains are uniform across firms, and the
optimal tax should be uniform as in Slemrod and Wil-
son. When there are two types of firms, some domesti-
cally owned and immobile and some internationally
owned and mobile, the marginal social gain is positive
on the first group and maybe even negative on the sec-
ond group, as in Hong and Smart. Real-world marginal
social benefit functions will be far more complex. Firms
cannot easily be classified as either domestic or interna-
tional. Some of the international firms might be owned
partially by rich domestic citizens, while other small
seemingly domestic firms might be owned by interna-
tional investors. Furthermore, more dimensions of het-
erogeneity might exist besides ownership and mobility.
For example, the ability to conceal tax payments might
not be exclusive to the international group. A simple
policy conclusion is that when tax avoidance becomes
too widespread (i.e., it extends to the small domestic
firms), no firm will pay taxes anymore, and tax avoid-
ance certainly lowers welfare because it becomes impos-
sible to tax capital. The intermediate cases require a fur-
ther investigation.
A central thought in the above discussion is that the cor-
porate tax is not a tax on a uniform group of firms. It
might therefore be optimal to differentiate the tax sys-
tem between different subgroups. Such an idea is not
new. Besides Hong and Smart, a number of articles
write about the desirability of preferential tax regimes
for obtaining tax revenue. A key finding here is that
preferential regimes are to be preferred under some
assumptions. When the corporate tax base can be sepa-
rated into two, or more, homogeneous groups with each
an own degree of mobility, it has been shown that it is
optimal to have a lower tax rate on the more mobile tax
base.49 This is just an application of the Ramsey inverse
elasticity principle. When the government is restricted
by international rules to set a uniform tax rate, it is
forced to tax both suboptimally. However, when one tax
base is mobile between countries while the other is
immobile internationally (although domestically elastic),
this conclusion might no longer hold.50 The equilibrium
in such a tax game results in a low tax on the mobile
base and a high tax on the immobile base, and this latter
tax is not affected by tax competition considerations at
all. It can now be shown that it is optimal to impose a
uniform tax on both bases. The immobile base causes
the uniform tax to be above the low rate, yielding more
revenue on the mobile tax base. The revenue loss from
the relatively low uniform tax on the immobile base is
partially compensated by an increase of the immobile
tax base (e.g., a lower capital tax would induce domestic
citizens to save more).
However, it must be recognised that these articles focus
solely on the revenue-raising potential of the tax system.
They do not attempt to explain the fundamental role of
the corporate tax in the tax system, do not model the
potential misallocation of resources into tax planning
and therefore stay short of answering the research ques-
tion formulated in the introduction of this article. The
articles just try to answer the question whether prefer-
ential tax regimes help in raising revenue in an efficient
way, an issue that I mentioned is not at the heart of the
problem.
6 Conclusion
This article explored the question of whether excessive
company taxation practices harm welfare. The public
discussion on this topic seems to be dominated by emo-
tions and associative thoughts related to ‘fair’ taxation,
whatever that may be. Within such a mindset, it seems
natural to demand a substantial tax payment from mul-
tinational enterprises operating within the boundaries of
a country. This article discussed some crucial points
that are completely missing from the debate. Contrary
to the commonly held beliefs, the article showed that
economists have not yet come to a clear conclusion.
49. See Keen, above n. 18.
50. See E. Janeba and W. Peters, ‘Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the
Gains from Non-Discrimination: The Case for Interest Taxation in
Europe’, 109 Economic Journal, at 93-101 (1999). A more general
treatment is given in E. Janeba and M. Smart (eds.), ‘Is Targeted Tax
Competition Less Harmful Than Its Remedies?’, International Tax and
Public Finance, 10, at 259-280 (2003).
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First, a consistent conceptual framework of thought is
absent in the public debate. Arguments from the eco-
nomic literature suggest that the government should
only use the corporate tax when the government has a
hard time observing individual capital income and finds
it difficult to distinguish between capital and labour
income. As such, the corporate tax serves as a ‘backstop’
to preserve the redistributive function of the individual
income tax. Opinion leaders seem unaware of the exist-
ence of a discussion regarding the economic arguments
surrounding the corporate tax. Instead, this discussion
is replaced by a simple, and fundamentally flawed, heu-
ristic: the corporate tax is important because it generates
tax revenue from firms that otherwise has to be collec-
ted from labourers and consumers. This heuristic is
fundamentally flawed also because the corporate tax is
paid by labourers and consumers and revenue is not the
argument for having a corporate tax; a lump sum levy
can be used for such a policy goal.
Second, the strong result from the tax competition liter-
ature echoes the public discussion. This strong result,
which appears in most articles using the classical tax
competition model, claims that tax rates on mobile tax
bases tend to be too low from a social point of view. In
these models, action by a central authority is needed to
ensure that social welfare is increased. However, the
classical tax competition model is too simplistic to cover
excessive company taxation practices, which is the sub-
ject of this article. Furthermore, its conclusions only
hold when one has a very positive view of government.
Finally, even detailed simulation studies cannot find a
substantial welfare gain from coordinated action by a
central authority (e.g., the EC).
Third, some recent articles have discussed excessive
company taxation practices in a more detailed model
coming to opposing views. When one assumes that all
firms are inherently identical and when the ability to
evade or avoid taxes is randomly distributed over these
firms, avoidance surely reduces welfare. However, when
one assumes that firms are heterogeneous and that the
government wants to tax some firms more than others
from a redistributive argument, and when the ability to
evade or avoid is negatively related to this redistributive
argument, tax planning might increase welfare.
Academic economists are expected to come to the most
objective conclusion possible. For the subject of this
article, the welfare effects of excessive company taxation
practices, the objective conclusion is that we do not
know and the most important question is still up in the
air: What is the size of resources used in tax planning
compared with the welfare gain (or loss) that such
behaviour yields for the economy as a whole by creating
an effective tax system that is closer to (further from)
optimal than the current legal system? Until this ques-
tion is answered appropriately, my advice would be: do
not rush into anything that cannot be easily undone.
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